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The Empirical Dilemma of
International Law

MICHAEL D. RAMSEY*

Modern international law rests, at least rhetorically, upon the consent
of nations. That is most obviously true of treaties, which form a central
part of the modern world order, and which manifest their signatory
nations’ explicit agreement upon purportedly binding terms.1 It is also
true of the other principal branch of international law, unwritten or
“customary” international law, which is said to arise from the common
practices of nations followed out of a sense of legal obligation.2
Nations’ consent to customary law is implicit rather than explicit, but no
less vital, because it provides an objective basis for saying what is or is
not the rule and why a nation should follow it. Looking to customary
practices as binding sources of law thus aligns unwritten international
law with the more familiar written obligations of treaties. In each case,
it can be said, nations have consented, and indeed promised, to act in a
certain way—in one case implicitly, in the other explicitly. So violation
of international law amounts to a nation’s violation of its own promise
freely given and objectively reflected in a writing, or in a custom. As
David Bederman puts it, “We take it as an article of faith that the
modern law of nations derives its legitimacy from the consent of
states.”3
* Professor of Law, University of San Diego School of Law.
1. See IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 580–609 (6th
ed. 2003); DAVID J. BEDERMAN, CLASSICAL CANNONS (2001).
2. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE
UNITED STATES § 102(2) (1987).
3. DAVID J. BEDERMAN, THE SPIRIT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 94 (2002).
Bederman elaborates: “The doctrine of consent generally teaches that the common
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The force of this model can be seen from the example of
ambassadorial immunity, a familiar unwritten rule of international law.4
For hundreds of years nations exchanged ambassadors, usually without
any written agreement as to their status and protection. Yet it was
implicitly understood that even enemy nations extended immunity to
each others’ ambassadors—a sensible practice, especially in times of
primitive communications—else enemies would have no reliable means
to negotiate. That practice was sufficiently strong that a nation’s
agreement to accept an ambassador implicitly incorporated an agreement
to respect the traditional immunities ambassadors were afforded. Of
course, immunity was not invariably respected, but it was respected
enough that nations, and ambassadors themselves, relied upon it in
sending embassies, and breaches of it were sharply condemned.5
The consent-based version of international law is not the only way of
looking at the matter. In its early conceptions, international law was closely
aligned with—and indeed often treated as a subset of—natural law.6
That is, the law of nations might be thought to arise not from nations’
consent, but from the nature of the world and of humankind. It could,
therefore, be identified through a process combining moral and
deductive reasoning.7 Justice Story wrote that the law of nations is law
“that may be fairly deduced by correct reasoning from the rights and
consent of states voluntarily entering the international community gives international law
its validity. States—and presumably other international actors—are said to be bound by
international law because they have given their consent.” Id. at 14. On the various
sources of international law, see id. at 27–48; BROWNLIE, supra note 1, at 1–29.
The concept of customary international law has been attacked at its core. See Jack L.
Goldsmith & Eric A. Posner, A Theory of Customary International Law, 66 U. CHI. L.
REV. 1113 (1999); J. Patrick Kelly, The Twilight of Customary International Law, 40
VA. J. INT’L L. 449 (2000). The present essay takes no position on this debate, only
asking whether, if customary international law exists, how we are to identify it.
4. See BROWNLIE, supra note 1, at 349–69.
5. For a history of ambassadorial immunity, see generally GARRETT MATTINGLY,
RENAISSANCE DIPLOMACY (Jonathan Cape 1963) (originally published 1955).
6. E.g., SAMUEL PUFENDORF, ON THE LAW OF NATURE AND OF NATIONS, reprinted
in THE CLASSICS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (James Brown Scott ed., 1934) (originally
published in 1672); J. J. BURLAMAQUI, THE PRINCIPLES OF NATURAL AND POLITIC LAW
(Thomas Nugent trans., 5th ed. 1807) (originally published in 1748).
7. On the naturalist element in international law see BEDERMAN, supra note 3, at
5–6, 11–13. For historical accounts, see ARTHUR NUSSBAUM, A CONCISE HISTORY OF
THE LAW OF NATIONS 147–64 (rev. ed. 1962) and WILHELM G. GREWE, THE EPOCHS OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW (Michael Byers trans., 2000). As Professor Bederman puts it:
[T]he issue is whether law for the international community is exclusively the
product of consent by the participants in the system (however manifested) or
also includes enduring truths that somehow reflect the fundamental values of
that community. Put another way, are all rules in a legal community internally
generated . . . or is there also a metaphysic of first principles that govern the
system?
BEDERMAN, supra note 3, at 19.
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duties of nations, and the nature of moral obligation . . . .”8 But as
Professor Bederman puts it (with some understatement), “[t]he
exogenous character of natural law rules has always posed difficult
problems for identifying a basis of international obligation.”9 More
bluntly stated, why should one vision of the “nature of moral obligation”
bind a nation which does not subscribe to it, and how is one to choose
among competing claims of the “rights and duties of nations” that are
founded only in moral right?10
A consent-based conception of international law responds to the
theoretical critique of naturalist international law—that it is, in effect, no
more than conflicting moral claims. Consent supplies both an objective
basis for international law, and a sound reason for respecting it. It
accords best with the way we think about “law” (as opposed to moral
and other claims upon behavior) in an age in which positivism is, if not
universally triumphant, at least the dominant paradigm. As a result, very
early in the modern history of international law, writers began reaching
for evidence of the practice of nations to support claims of what they
thought should be the right rule on a subject.11 The rising tide of
positivism in the late eighteenth century and nineteenth century
reinforced international law’s reliance on consent, and by the middle of
the following century the charter of the International Court of Justice
could confidently list, as one of the two principal sources of international
law (along with treaties), “international custom, as evidence of a general
practice accepted as law.”12 Or, in the words of the Restatement of
Foreign Relations Law, customary international law “results from a
general and consistent practice of states followed by them from a sense
of legal obligation.”13
This objective basis of unwritten international law is a particular
comfort to U.S. courts, which are called upon to discern and apply rules
of international law in various circumstances. The range of these
circumstances is the subject of substantial debate, but there is no serious
8. United States v. La Jeune Eugenie, 26 F. Cas. 832, 846 (C.C.D. Mass. 1822)
(No. 15,551).
9. BEDERMAN, supra note 3, at 12.
10. For a discussion on this point, see generally MARTTI KOSKENNIEMI, FROM
APOLOGY TO UTOPIA (1989).
11. On the emergence of positivism, see NUSSBAUM, supra note 7, at 164–85.
12. Statute of the International Court of Justice, Art. 38 (indexed at 59 Stat. 1055).
13. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES § 102(2) (1987).
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contest that U.S. courts must sometimes apply international law. To
pick two noncontroversial examples, courts must apply international law
when U.S. statutes direct them to, by referring to or adopting standards
from international law;14 and courts must identify rules of international
law in applying the canon of construction that ambiguous statutes shall
not be construed to violate international law when another meaning is
available.15 Unlike diplomats and commentators, courts do not merely
debate and hypothesize about the proper content of international law, but
must actually decide the specific content of particular rules, in the context of
rendering a binding judgment affecting tangible rights. To do so on the basis
of an objective investigation of the actual practices of nations fits
comfortably, at least in theory, with our vision of the judicial process—in a
way that the naturalistic version of international law does not. It is not
surprising, therefore, that consent reflected by customary practices has, as
Professor Bederman says, become an article of rhetorical faith.16
But the consent-based theory of international law faces an awesome
challenge in practice, particularly in the context of its application in
modern U.S. courts. While most commentators agree that U.S. courts
should apply international law at least in some circumstances, there has
been little discussion as to whether U.S. courts are institutionally
equipped for the project, and what that project, properly pursued, should
entail.17
As discussed at the outset, consent-based theories of international law
depend upon establishing common practices of nations that nations
themselves regard as obligatory. This is its crucial objective basis, what
sets it apart from one person’s (or one nation’s) vision of international
morality. As Professor Bederman urges: “it is vital for customary
international law’s legitimacy that it be based on empirically observed
state practice,”18 which entails “an objective inquiry: Have international
actors really followed the rule? Has the practice been consistent? Has
the practice been followed for a sufficient period of time?”19 That is, the
14. See United States v. Smith, 18 U.S. 153 (1820) (applying federal statute
penalizing the crime of piracy on the high seas as “defined by the law of nations”);
Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980) (applying federal Alien Tort Claims
Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1350, granting federal jurisdiction to “action[s] by an alien for a tort
only, committed in violation of the law of nations”).
15. Talbot v. Seeman, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 1, 32 (1801); Murray v. Schooner
Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 78 (1804); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE
FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 114.
16. BEDERMAN, supra note 3, at 94.
17. U.S. courts’ practice in finding international law remains underexamined. For
an excellent initial and critical inquiry, see A. Mark Weisburd, American Judges and
International Law, 36 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1475 (2003).
18. BEDERMAN, supra note 3, at 34.
19. Id. at 33.
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project is fundamentally a factual inquiry, seeking an objective answer
about the state of the real world.
In the foundational U.S. cases on the application of international law,
courts undertook and discharged, by and large uncontroversially, this
empirical imperative. In Paquete Habana—famous for its oft-cited if
poorly understood dictum that “international law is part of our law”—the
Supreme Court faced the specific question of whether fishing vessels
were exempt from a wartime naval blockade under the customary laws
of war.20 The Court examined practice in a range of nations, during a
succession of wars dating back to the 1400s, to conclude that
international law did recognize such an exemption.21 That conclusion
might be questioned,22 but methodologically the Court’s approach seems
defensible. Similarly, in Hilton v. Guyot, decided at about the same
time, the Court considered whether international law imposed upon a
nation’s courts the obligation to recognize and enforce the judgments of
foreign courts.23 Again the Court reviewed the practice of a range of nations,
this time finding no consistent practice and hence no international law
obligation.24 One might conclude, then, that the empirical investigation
of international practice has an honored history in U.S. jurisprudence.
But particularly in the context of modern international law, the
empirical imperative seems increasingly problematic on several grounds.
Understanding the practices of nations on any given point is a daunting
empirical project in any age. We may wonder whether the Paquete
Habana Court really did all that was necessary to understand the
European rules on blockade. That worry is compounded by at least two
modern trends. First, many more nations, and more diverse nations,
must now be counted as making up the international community. At the
time of Hilton and Paquete Habana, European empires covered most of
the globe. Further, in an unfortunate turn of phrase, international law
proclaimed that it looked to the practices of “civilized nations,” thus
20. Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 686–88 (1900).
21. Id. at 686–700.
22. See id. (seeming to show an inconsistent practice).
23. Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113 (1895).
24. Id. at 217–28; see also The Scotia, 81 U.S. (14 Wall.) 170, 187 (1871) (noting
that the law of the sea, “[l]ike all the laws of nations, . . . rests upon the common consent
of civilized communities. It is of force, not because it was prescribed by any superior
power, but because it has been generally accepted as a rule of conduct”); id. at 186–87
(determining law of nations relating to liability for a collision at sea on the basis of
British regulations to which thirty major maritime nations had manifested consent).
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conveniently permitting one to discount practices of many non-European
societies.25 Nineteenth century international law thus solved part of its
empirical problem by cutting down the number of relevant societies to a
relatively small group of European-heritage nations whose legal systems
were relatively accessible. That approach is no longer sustainable.
There are now in the neighborhood of 200 independent nations, many
with distinctive non-European value systems. It simply will not do to
identify the practices of a number of major European countries and
proclaim them to be the practices of the world (as the Court did in
Paquete Habana and Hilton).26 Surely a very substantial portion of the
200 nations must be investigated before any claims can be made about
universal practice.
It is not just the sheer volume of this enterprise that is daunting, but
also the accessibility of the practices it must investigate. The practice of
Britain, or even Germany and France, may be relatively accessible to
nonspecialists through secondary sources. The practice of highly
developed non-European legal systems, such as China or the Islamic
countries, may require an expertise that takes years to acquire. The
practice of less formal legal systems, such as may prevail in parts of
Africa and Asia, may be obscure to anyone who has not grown up with
them. Investigation of what any single one of these systems does with
respect to a given legal question would require the tools and time of an
expert; international law’s empirical project calls for investigation of
what all (or at least most) of them do—at the speed of litigation.
A related problem is the expansion of the fields that international law
purports to govern. In the nineteenth century international law’s scope
was fairly limited, encompassing principally diplomatic relations
between nations, such as the law of ambassadorial immunity mentioned
earlier, laws of war (which themselves contained only the most basic
humanitarian protections) and admiralty matters. The development of
new fields of international law, such as international environmental law
and international human rights,27 has vastly increased the subjects in
25. See Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. at 686–700 (referring to “ancient usage among
civilized nations,” meaning, in effect, European nations, although acknowledging that
Japan had recently been “admitted into the rank of civilized nations” and therefore taking
account of Japanese practice); The Scotia, 81 U.S. at 187 (looking to “common consent
of civilized communities” and relying almost exclusively on European and Europeaninfluenced jurisdictions); Hilton, 159 U.S. at 163 (referring to the “acts and usages of
civilized nations”); id. at 218–27 (evaluating European and European-influenced
jurisdictions).
26. See Kelly, supra note 3, at 460 (criticizing modern international law discourse
on this ground).
27. See Edith Brown Weiss, International Environmental Law: Contemporary
Issues and the Emergence of a New World Order, 81 GEO. L.J. 675 (1993); Jack L.
Goldsmith & Eric A. Posner, Understanding the Resemblance Between Modern and
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which international law claims may be raised.28 And even within
traditional categories, such as the laws of war, international law has
developed greater levels of sophistication (moving, for example, from a
regime which merely claimed that prisoners of war not be summarily
killed to a regime that attempts to govern their day-to-day treatment at a
significant level of detail).
These developments compound the difficulties of the modern
empirical project. Many of the newer arenas of international law involve
not only relations between nations at the diplomatic and military level,
but the internal organization and governance of nations. This makes the
discovery of reliable information even more difficult. It may be
comparatively easy to describe how a non-European legal system like,
for example, China, treats foreign ambassadors; discovering Chinese
practice on a matter of internal law (such as the application of the death
penalty) is much further removed from the access of foreign
investigators.29 Similarly, the increasing sophistication of international
law means that the legal questions asked will be increasingly detailed,
and thus more difficult in proof. It is easier, for example, to find out if a
nation’s military routinely executes prisoners of war than it is to find out
details on the conditions of confinement.
A third difficulty is that international law has become increasingly
normative, as compared to the pure positivism of the nineteenth century.
Modern international human rights law is not merely a descriptive
project to identify the prevailing human rights practices, but also a
normative project to promote a particular vision of human rights.30 The
modern law of war initiation is not merely a project to describe the
circumstances under which nations go to war, but also a project to
promote peace.31 Of course, this is not a problem—and indeed is much
to be commended—from the perspective of the betterment of humanity.
But it is a problem from the narrow perspective of implementing the
Traditional Customary International Law, 40 VA. J. INT’L L. 639 (2000).
28. Compare HENRY WHEATON, ELEMENTS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (1836) and
WILLIAM EDWARD HALL, A TREATISE ON INTERNATIONAL LAW (4th ed. 1895), with
BROWNLIE, supra note 1.
29. For discussion of a specific instance of this difficulty, see Michael D. Ramsey,
International Materials and Domestic Rights: Reflections on Atkins and Lawrence, 98
AM. J. INT’L L. 69 (2004). See also Kelly, supra note 3, at 483.
30. See Harold Hongju Koh, Paying “Decent Respect” to World Opinion on the
Death Penalty, 35 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1085, 1109–29 (2002).
31. For skeptical observations on the modern law of war initiation, see generally
MICHAEL GLENNON, LIMITS OF LAW, PREROGATIVES OF POWER (2001).
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empirical project that underlies the adjudication of customary
international law. As international law becomes more normative, there
is likely to be an increasing gap between what international law’s
expositors claim and the actual practices of nations. Relatedly, there is
likely to be an increasing gap between what nations’ spokespeople say
and what their governments actually do. In sum, we may expect a gap
between rhetoric and reality—a gap readily identifiable, for example, in
both international human rights law and in the laws of war.32
Moreover, the parallel expansion of the fields in which international
law claims a voice and of the societies which make up the relevant
community means that, even if empirical difficulties can be overcome,
common practice seems increasingly unlikely to exist. The so-called
“civilized” nations of the nineteenth century shared a common European
heritage, and in particular they shared a common understanding of how
nations interacted at a diplomatic and military level. Consensus views,
not surprisingly, actually existed on many points that international law
sought to govern. Today, however, the world’s nations do not share a
common heritage, and international law seeks to govern matters on
which even nations with a European heritage have no common
outlook.33 In addition, it is notoriously easier to disprove a consensus
than to prove one. As empirical difficulties mount, that point becomes
more pronounced. Looking at a few accessible jurisdictions may be
sufficient to show a lack of consensus, but looking at a large number of
jurisdictions that share common practices may not even be enough to
show consensus.
And there is a final difficulty: so far, I have addressed only the first of
the prerequisites for binding customary practices, i.e., that the practices
be common to all or most of the community of nations. The classic
formulation of customary international law also requires that nations
follow these practices out of a sense of legal obligation.34 International
courts and scholars are not even in satisfactory agreement on what this
means in the abstract.35 But assuming that it asks for some empirical
investigation into the actual state of mind of a nation’s policymakers,
again that seems an increasingly daunting project for the reasons
outlined above. As the relevant societies to be investigated become
32. See generally KOSKENNIEMI, supra note 10. See also BEDERMAN, supra note 3,
at 58 (noting “[t]he cognitive dissonance in international law’s preference for what states
say over what they do”).
33. Consider, for example, divergent U.S. and European views of the death
penalty, a matter that no one in the nineteenth century would have thought was covered
by international law.
34. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES § 102(2) (1987); BEDERMAN, supra note 3, at 32–40.
35. See GLENNON, supra note 31, at 52–60.

1250

RAMSEY.DOC

[VOL. 41: 1243, 2004]

8/22/2019 11:52 AM

The Empirical Dilemma of International Law
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

more numerous and diverse, and as the scope of international law
becomes more removed from diplomatic and military relations and more
addressed to internal relations within nations, it becomes increasingly
doubtful that we can say why a nation follows a given practice, even if
we can solve the empirical problem of identifying the practice as a
factual matter. Generally, a nation adopts a given practice because it
wants to adopt it for pragmatic or ideological reasons. Asking whether a
nation feels bound by a practice is essentially asking a hypothetical:
suppose a nation changed its mind on the pragmatic or ideological
grounds that caused it to adopt the practice—would it feel free to
abandon the practice? It is hard to imagine that question being
satisfactorily answered for 200-odd countries on a wide range of issues.
****
There are at least three potential escapes from these empirical
difficulties, but none is particularly satisfactory. The first, increasingly
employed by modern U.S. courts, is to substitute more accessible proxies in
the place of investigation of actual practices.36 One might look, for
example, to decisions of international courts and agencies, whose
opinions are relatively accessible and becoming more common. This is
a plausible step if the decisions of these bodies are themselves reliably
bottomed upon empirical research into customary practices. But in
many ways this simply pushes the problem back a step. International
bodies may be somewhat more able to conduct the empirical project than
U.S. courts, but their advantages are likely to be marginal only. Further,
U.S. courts are not well placed to assure themselves that the international
courts they cite are in fact getting the practices right, or that they are
even making the appropriate effort. U.S. courts have little information about
the institutional structure, inherent biases and jurisprudential practices of
international bodies, and so have little basis to judge their reliability.
That being the case, there is little ex ante ground to say that, for example
a judgment of the International Court of Justice on a question of
customary international law reflects the actual practices of nations.
U.S. courts might also look to the statements of nonadjudicatory
international bodies, and to the statements of collective bodies such as
36. See Weisburd, supra note 17, at 1477 (noting the empirical difficulties and
observing that “[f]ederal courts have sought to escape this morass by relying primarily
on academic writings, the Restatement, and decisions by U.S. and international courts”).
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the U.N. General Assembly.37 Here, though, the gap between rhetoric
and reality is likely to be particularly wide. U.N. agencies and similar
bodies are not representative, and often occupy an advocacy or quasiadvocacy role.38 Statements of general principle at the U.N. and
elsewhere are cheap, and no structures exist to assure that they
correspond to anything in actual practice.
A further potential set of proxies are the opinions of academic experts
in international law. In theory, a body of academic specialists who have
the leisure to study the practices of nations on something other than a
litigation timetable seems an ideal proxy—so long as their goal is a
descriptive one. As the Court observed in Paquete Habana, a custombased theory of international law would look to the experts in
international law for guidance as to what the practices of nations are, not
for their opinions as to what it should be.39 The difficulty, though, is that
as international law has become increasingly normative and shared
practices increasingly difficult to substantiate, it has become harder to
separate description and prescription. Moreover, most academic
inquiries into international law lack empirical foundations. One need
not be a social scientist, a trained empiricist nor an expert in the society
and culture of even one non-European legal system to become a
professor of international law (and thus a putative expert). And a (nonscientific) survey of the academic literature of international law suggests
that it does not commonly even purport to be making empirical claims.
Like most other academic legal writing, it is principally normative or
theoretical, not descriptive.
This aspect of international law scholarship need not be problematic,
if it is recognized for what it is. An unapologetic defense of normativity
comes from Louis Sohn: “I submit that states really never make
international law on the subject of human rights. It is made by the
37. E.g., Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 882 (2d Cir. 1980) (relying
principally on the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A(III), U.N.
GAOR, 3d Sess., U.N. Doc. A/810, at 71 (1948), and the Declaration on the Protection
of All Persons from Being Subjected to Torture, G.A. Res. 3452, 30th Sess., U.N.
GAOR, U.N Doc. A/10408 (1975)).
38. For example, U.N. human rights organs, if they are doing their job correctly,
are in their nature advocates for the expansion of human rights principles, including
expansion at the expense of other principles of government. One would expect them to
take an aggressive view of what is required by international human rights law, even in
the face of substantial practice to the contrary.
39. [R]esort must be had . . . to the works of jurists and commentators, who by
years of labor, research and experience, have made themselves peculiarly well
acquainted with the subjects of which they treat. Such works are resorted to by
judicial tribunals, not for the speculations of their authors concerning what the
law ought to be, but for trustworthy evidence of what the law really is.
Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900).

1252

RAMSEY.DOC

[VOL. 41: 1243, 2004]

8/22/2019 11:52 AM

The Empirical Dilemma of International Law
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

people that care; the professors, the writers of textbooks and casebooks,
and the authors of articles in leading international law journals.”40 The
Second Circuit recently singled out this statement in particular for
criticism, saying:
Some contemporary international law scholars assert that they themselves are
an authentic source of customary international law, perhaps even more relevant
than the practices and acts of states. . . . This notion—that professors of
international law enjoy a special competence to prescribe the nature of
customary international law wholly unmoored from legitimating territorial or
national responsibilities, the interests and practices of States, or (in countries
such as ours) the processes of democratic consent—may not be unique, but it is
certainly without merit.41

With due respect to both sides, it seems that they are simply talking
about different kinds of international law. Professor Sohn echoes the
natural law tradition in claiming for scholars the right and ability to
discourse on the natural law of nations, and to attempt to persuade others
of the natural soundness of their views. That recalls, at least in part, the
approach of leading writers of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.42
But the Second Circuit is surely correct to say that this is not customary
international law, arising from the practices of nations. That does not
mean that it is invalid, but it does mean (as the Second Circuit held) that
standing alone it cannot claim the authority of custom, nor of state
consent. As the Supreme Court recognized in Paquete Habana, scholars of
international law serve two functions, providing “speculations . . . concerning
what the law ought to be” and “trustworthy evidence of what the law
really is.”43 The difficulty is that international law writings (and judges
reading them) frequently fail to make this distinction, rendering them
poor guides for judges engaged in an empirical project.44 A final group
40. Louis B. Sohn, Sources of International Law, 25 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 399,
399 (1996).
41. United States v. Yousef, 327 F.3d 56, 101–02 (2d Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 124
S. Ct. 353 (2003).
42. See supra notes 6–8 and accompanying text.
43. Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. at 700.
44. For criticisms of international law academic writing in this vein, see Jack
Goldsmith, Sovereignty, International Relations Theory, and International Law, 52
STAN. L. REV. 959, 960–61 (2000) (book review); David J. Bederman, I Hate
International Law Scholarship (Sort of), 1 CHI. J. INT’L L. 75, 75–78 (2000).
As several authorities have pointed out, this is also true of the Restatement (Third) of
Foreign Relations Law, which simultaneously purports to “restate” existing law and to
give suggestions as to the “better” law. See Weisburd, supra note 17, at 1513–17.
Indeed, one appeals court recently held that it was error for a district court to rely on the
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of proxies common in U.S. courts are the provisions of multilateral
treaties.45 This asserted proxy requires some explanation, for one might
think that a provision contained in a multilateral treaty would be binding,
if at all, under the international and national laws of treaties. That is, if a
provision is binding as a matter of treaty law, customary international
law simply does not enter into consideration; if the provision is not
binding upon a particular nation or court as a matter of treaty law, it
might seem that it is simply nonbinding. The matter is not quite so simple,
however, for some treaty provisions parallel rules of customary
international law. That might be so because the treaty specifically sets out
to codify preexisting customary international law. It also might be so
because initially the treaty expressed a noncustomary rule, but over time
the rule expressed in the treaty came to be seen as a universal rule,
adopted and accepted even by nations not part of the treaty regime. In
either event, there is some truth to the claim that multilateral treaties and
customary international law can overlap and be reflective of one another.
It is quite another thing, though, to say that the bare existence of a
multilateral treaty can solve the empirical dilemma of adjudicating
customary international law. As an initial matter, to say that some
multilateral treaties overlap with customary international law is not to
say that they all do, or even that most of them do. Whether they do or
not depends on practice: what practice existed before the treaty, and
what practice exists under the treaty, both with respect to members of
the treaty and, more critically, countries who are not members. In short,
one cannot know whether a treaty is a proxy for practice without
examining the practice. In fact, treaties provide no shortcut, because
only a reliable empirical investigation can answer the question of
practice. A further problem arises from the second part of the test for
customary law: the practice must be followed out of a sense of
Restatement as evidence of a particular practice of international law, because “treatises
are not primary sources of international law” but instead frequently contain “projections
of future trends or the advocacy of the ‘better rule’” in addition to or instead of “accurate
descriptions of the past practices of states.” Yousef, 327 F.3d at 99. As the court further
pointed out, “the Restatements do not merely (or necessarily) ‘restate’ the law as it is”
but also “propose the better rule and provide the rationale for choosing it.” Id. at 99
n.31. That description is particularly true of the Restatement (Third) of Foreign
Relations Law. See Stephen C. McCaffrey, The Restatement’s Treatment of Sources and
Evidence of International Law, 25 INT’L LAW. 311, 312–16 (1991) (discussing the Third
Restatement’s departures from prior law); David B. Massey, Note, How the American
Law Institute Influences Customary Law: The Reasonableness Requirement of the
Restatement of Foreign Relations Law, 22 YALE J. INT’L L. 419, 420–21 (1997) (making
a similar point in the context of rules on extraterritorial jurisdiction).
45. E.g., Alvarez-Machain v. United States, 331 F.3d 604, 620–21 & nn.16–17
(9th Cir. 2003) (relying on human rights treaties to establish a customary rule against
arbitrary detention), rev’d on other grounds, 124 S. Ct. 2739 (2004).
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obligation.46 Of course, treaty obligations are (one hopes) followed out of
a sense of obligation to the treaty. But that does not make them also part
of customary law. The relevant question is whether the same obligations
would be accepted in the absence of the treaty. One can at least make a
start on this question by looking at countries that are not signatories to
the treaty, to see if they recognize a parallel nontreaty obligation. With
respect to nations that are signatories to the treaty, however, the question
becomes a vexing counterfactual one: would the nation feel bound by
the particular obligation in question even if it withdrew from the treaty?
It is hard to know how one would even begin to answer that question.
A further problem with the multilateral-treaty-as-proxy idea is a
variation on the gap between rhetoric and reality. Regrettably, that gap is
common for treaty obligations, particularly in sensitive areas such as
human rights and laws of war.47 Merely because an obligation is reflected
in a treaty does not mean that all or even most of the treaties’ adherents
follow it in practice. That does not necessarily excuse the failure to
follow it as a matter of treaty law, but it surely means that the obligation
cannot exist as a matter of customary law. There is, in sum, no necessary
connection between what countries agree to in treaties and what they
actually do. To the extent custom is understood to depend on what
countries actually do, treaties simply do not help to answer that question.
For these reasons, the usual proxies do not work as stand-ins for
investigation of actual practice. A second potential escape from the
empirical bind is manipulation of the level of generality at which the
practices of nations are identified. Consider, for example, the question
whether the United States has violated international law in its treatment of
the detainees at Guantanamo. One potential charge is that the detainees
have been subject to “torture” because they have been imprisoned under
inhumane conditions.48 In the terms of this article, however, that claim
would seem empirically challenging to establish under customary
international law. It would involve (at minimum) comparison of the
conditions at Guantanamo with the conditions generally prevailing in
prisons throughout the world (a colossal empirical project). Indeed, even
46. See supra note 2.
47. See GLENNON, supra note 31, at 67–100 (discussing state practice under the
U.N. Charter with respect to war initiation); Oona A. Hathaway, Do Human Rights
Treaties Make a Difference?, 111 YALE L.J. 1935, 1937 (2002) (discussing divergence
between obligations of human rights treaties and state practice).
48. See Diane Marie Amann, Guantanamo, 42 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 263,
323–35 (2004).
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that project is likely not sufficient, because one might need to consider
whether the particular dangerousness of suspected terrorist internees, and
their potential access to vital national security information, might justify (in
terms of common practice) departure from conditions ordinarily applied
to prisoners around the world.49
As an alternative, though, one might proceed as follows: one might
observe that, as a matter of custom, nations think it forbidden by
international law to engage in torture. This is itself not obviously true as
an empirical matter, but at least there are substantial authorities that state
it to be true.50 Next, one might observe that some of the practices occurring
at Guantanamo arguably fit within the ordinary definition of “torture.”51
Perhaps this would show, without the need for systematic examination
of worldwide prison conditions, that international law violations exist at
Guantanamo.52
It should be clear that the empirical problem cannot be escaped so
easily. A condition of confinement may or may not amount to “torture,”
depending on what definition of that abstract term is used. But it cannot
amount to the type of torture that violates customary international law
unless that practice itself (or a closely analogous practice) is contrary to the
practices of nations. Taking any other view of the matter would
eliminate the need for nations’ implicit consent, through custom, that is
essential to the idea of customary international law. Nations consent
implicitly to the proscription of certain practices, not to abstract principles
that can then be invoked to establish specific rules to which nations have
not consented. Put another way, the only way to establish the
proposition that the confinement at Guantanamo is torture proscribed by
customary international law is to investigate whether the practices
occurring at Guantanamo are themselves inconsistent with the practices of
nations. Resorting to claims about abstract principles may be sufficient
49. To be clear, this is not an argument that the detainees are being appropriately
treated—only an argument that their maltreatment, as a matter of customary practice, is
difficult to establish.
50. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES § 702 (1987); Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 880 (2d Cir. 1980). To be
clear, this question is distinct from the issue of prohibitions of torture under treaty or
statutory law. See Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, Degrading
Treatment or Punishment, G.A. Res. 39/46, U.N. GAOR, 39th Sess., pt. 1, art. 1, Annex,
Supp. No. 51, at 197, U.N. Doc. A/39/51 (1984) (entered into force June 26, 1987);
Torture Convention Implementation Act, Pub. L. 103-236, tit. V, § 506(a), 108 Stat. 463,
463 (1994) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340–2340B (2000)).
51. See AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 1824 (4th
ed. 2000) (defining torture as “infliction of severe physical pain as a means of
punishment or coercion. . . . Excruciating physical or mental pain . . . .”).
52. This sort of argument was made and rejected in the contexts of international
environmental law and genocide in Beanal v. Freeport-McMoran, Inc., 197 F.3d 161,
168 (5th Cir. 1999).
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to establish an abstract principle, but cannot in turn establish a specific
rule of conduct that could be applied, for example, at Guantanamo.53
A third potential escape is the idea of jus cogens. Many theories of
international law recognize the concept known as jus cogens (literally,
mandatory law), which (it is said) represents propositions of international
law so fundamental that no country may deviate from them.54 A modest
way of looking at this principle is simply as a corollary to another
principle of customary law, the so-called “persistent objector rule.” The
persistent objector rule holds that, even with respect to a customary
practice that is well-established and accepted by essentially all nations, a
nation may make known that it does not accept the practice as governing
its own actions.55 That is a logical extension of the idea that consent is
the touchstone of customary obligations: a nation that has never
consented to a rule, but instead has persistently objected to it, should not
be bound by it. Jus cogens might be a modification of this principle,
saying that with respect to certain fundamental customary principles, no
persistent objectors are tolerated. For example, it seems unlikely that a
nation could escape the customary norm of human rights law proscribing
genocide, merely by persistently maintaining its right to commit
genocide—other nations simply would not tolerate that deviation.56
If this is all jus cogens is, then it is not much help in the empirical
dilemma. But some descriptions speak of it as a set of fundamental
norms that are obligatory irrespective of the existence of customary
practice. That is, it simply does not matter whether a jus cogens
principle is commonly followed in practice, because practice cannot
excuse the violation of the mandatory principles of jus cogens. If that is
so, a court might not need to look into actual practice, if it discerned that
a rule was an element of jus cogens.
Put this way, however, it should be clear that this formulation has not
53. On the difficulty of choosing a level of generality, see GLENNON, supra note
31, at 50–51. The generality question is familiar to constitutional law scholars,
particularly where the Supreme Court seeks to identify “traditional” practices, as it does
in substantive due process analysis. See Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 127
(1989). Whatever the correct answer in constitutional law, though, international law
seems to demand identifying a customary practice at a fairly specific level, as a result of
the need to establish state consent.
54. BEDERMAN, supra note 3, at 39.
55. Id. at 37–38.
56. Relatedly, it is said that nations may not contract around jus cogens principles
by treaty. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, art. 53, 1155
U.N.T.S. 331, 344.
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solved, but only reoriented, the empirical dilemma. A court must have
some reason for thinking that a principle in question is a principle of jus
cogens. It could be that it is identified as such a principle by one of the
proxy sources identified above, such as experts in international law. But
this use of proxies is no sounder than the use of proxies as a substitute
for empirical inquiry into customary practices. Without knowing how
the “experts” identify jus cogens, the proxy adds little weight to the
decision—and if the experts do not identify jus cogens from practice (as
it seems often they do not),57 then the experts are not a useful customary
source. It might also be that jus cogens principles themselves arise from
practice. We might observe, for example, that nations not only adopt a
certain principle, but (as a factual matter) do not tolerate any deviation
from it on the part of other nations. This, however, simply returns us to
an empirical inquiry as to how nations actually behave; it does not allow
courts to escape that inquiry.
Another possibility is that jus cogens principles do not arise from
practice at all, but from fundamental beliefs about the nature of
humankind and of the international system. That is, we might think that
genocide violates jus cogens, not because it is rarely practiced or
because no nation will tolerate it (matters which might be empirically
disproved), but because we think it is fundamentally wrong. That is, our
view of genocide is rooted in our own beliefs, and does not depend on
anything empirically observable.
Such a view looks back to a long tradition in international law—the
tradition that equates international law with natural law.58 Stated
forthrightly, it avoids international law’s empirical challenges, by
denying that international law obligations must rest upon identifiable
customary practices.59 But, as discussed above, appeals to naturalism
face their own overawing difficulty, particularly when made in the
context of adjudication of concrete cases. It may be plausible and useful
57. See Weisburd, supra note 17, at 1505–13.
58. See supra notes 6–8.
59. Of course, it often is not stated forthrightly, and therein lies a substantial
problem. For example, the Ninth Circuit recently discussed jus cogens in a way that
suggested a naturalistic view, without clearly distinguishing between natural law and
custom:
[J]us cogens embraces customary laws considered binding on all nations and is
derived from values taken to be fundamental by the international community,
rather than from the fortuitous or selfinterested choices of nations. Whereas
customary international law derives solely from the consent of states, the
fundamental and universal norms constituting jus cogens transcend such
consent.
Alvarez-Machain v. United States, 331 F.3d 604, 613 (9th Cir. 2003). On problematic
judicial treatments of the idea of jus cogens in general, see Weisburd, supra note 17, at
1488–528.
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to advance and debate theories of obligation rested upon one’s view of
the nature of humankind in nonbinding settings such as diplomatic fora
or U.N. working groups. Our own view of courts, though, makes it
problematic to ask a court to render a final judgment on what appears to
be a matter of moral judgment. Of course, when it is a moral judgment
that we (Americans) all share—such as condemnation of genocide—the
difficulty is concealed. But on any matter that is seriously contested, a
judge’s opinion will be seen as lacking in legitimacy if it is not founded
on something more than the way the judge thinks the world should work
(or the way some authorities admired by the judge think the world
should work). It is for this reason that Professor Bederman reminds us
that the legitimacy of customary law depends on establishing actual
customary practices.60 Resort to naturalism solves the empirical
problem at the cost of raising an even greater theoretical problem of
legitimacy.61
In sum, international law faces a debilitating dilemma. On the one
hand, its claim to objective authority as positive law rests upon its
foundation in the customary practices of nations followed out of a sense
of legal obligation. Particularly in the modern world, one faces
extraordinary empirical difficulties in establishing common customary
practices of nations—both because the practices of a multitude of
diverse nations are difficult for outsiders to understand and identify, and
because there may not, in fact, be much commonality. A demand that
international law be founded on a rigorous empirical project greatly
reduces its ability to provide answers to difficult and contested
questions. On the other hand, one can solve this problem by
disconnecting international law from its foundation in custom, by
looking back to its historical basis in natural law. It then might have
important things to say about a wide range of critical issues, without the
crippling restraints rigorous empiricism places upon it. But this
60. BEDERMAN, supra note 3, at 94. As Professor Glennon observes, “The concept
of jus cogens is at odds with the basic supposition of customary international law that
norms are a function of the will of states.” GLENNON, supra note 31, at 41.
61. As Koskenniemi puts it,
Either the State’s subjective consent [to a purported rule of jus cogens] is
necessary or then it is not. If it is necessary, then we lose the distinctiveness of
jus cogens vis-à-vis ordinary custom, or treaty, altogether. . . . If it is not, then
we must accept jus cogens either as [a] form of majority legislation or a natural
morality.
KOSKENNIEMI, supra note 10, at 283.
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liberation of international law comes at the expense of its status as
authoritative positive law, and in particular at the expense of its
suitability for judicial resolution.
International law cannot escape its empirical difficulties, then, other
than by abandoning its claim to authority. One might be tempted to
conclude from this observation that courts should avoid international law
controversies altogether, leaving the elaboration and implementation of
international law to the political branches. That, however, would have
the judiciary turn its back on a long tradition of judicial implementation
of international law—a tradition that reaches to the time of the
Constitution’s framers and which was clearly contemplated by them.62 It
would also ignore the fact that, notwithstanding the difficulties to which
I have alluded, there are clear principles of international law that can be
derived from the practices of nations followed out of a sense of
obligation. There may not be as many such principles as some might
hope, but they do exist. The concept of ambassadorial immunity seems
a noncontroversial example, as does the prohibition on genocide. To say
that courts will often have trouble identifying international law does not
support them abandoning it altogether in cases in which they can
identify it.
Rather, I think that two broad but more cautious implications are as
follows. First, courts should do more to acknowledge the serious
empirical demands and challenges of the international law project. It is
inappropriate, and borders upon abdication, for courts (and lawyers) to
cite some strategically selected proxies, or strategically selected but
nonrepresentative examples of practice, in the place of serious empirical
inquiry, particularly in cases where there is serious doubt about the
correct view of the applicable rule. The fact that the empirical project is
hard, and in many cases will prove impossible, is no excuse.63
Relatedly, courts and commentators should not blur the distinction
between customary international law (which depends upon an
empirically identified custom) and other versions founded in natural law;
they should not try to give the latter the authority of the former.
Second, courts and commentators should be modest about the ability
of international law to decide concrete cases. In many cases international
62. See Koh, supra note 30, at 1085–109.
63. This point is increasingly being made by skeptical courts and commentators.
See GLENNON, supra note 31, at 58 (arguing that the views of international lawyers “need
to be held up to the light of hard evidence. To do so will entail disaggregating the
international community and getting behind the fanciful notion of its unitary ‘intent.’ It
will require, then, an empirical assessment of the actual record of state compliance.”);
United States v. Yousef, 327 F.3d 56, 99–103 (2d Cir. 2003) (emphasizing actual state
practice as the touchstone of international law); Weisburd, supra note 17, at 1477–78.
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law is most properly addressed to a nation’s political branches, particularly
the naturalistic version of international law favored by commentators.
Courts should recognize that the content of customary international law
rules will often be indeterminate, precisely because of the empirical
challenges it presents. This will mean, of course, that fewer claims
based on international law will be upheld, and claims that may seem
meritorious as a matter of natural justice will be dismissed.64 But at the
same time the narrower, more modest claims of international law will be
more sustainable, and more authoritative. In the long run that is a gain
for customary international law, not a loss. The greater threat to customary
international law is that it overreaches, trying to decide too many cases,
and thereby loses the legitimacy that it derives from the objective
standard of the actual practices of nations, identified through the
application of rigorous empirical inquiry.

64. See Beanal v. Freeport-McMoran, Inc., 197 F.3d 161, 166–67 (5th Cir. 1999)
(dismissing claim for environmental abuses).
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